Towards a new profile? : Development, humanitarian and conflict-resolution NGOs in the age of globalization by Debiel, Tobias & Sticht, Monika
79/2005
Institute for Development and Peace 
Towards a New Profile?
Development, Humanitarian and 
Conflict-Resolution NGOs
in the Age of Globalization
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht
  I
N
EF
  R
EP
O
RT
NOTES ON THE AUTHORS
Tobias Debiel, Dr. sc. pol., is Executive Director of the Institute for Development
and Peace (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen.
Before he took over this position in August 2004, he worked from February 2003 to July
2004 as Senior Researcher and Head of Research Group at the Center for Development
Research (Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, ZEF), University of Bonn, including
two terms as interim professor of Political and Cultural Change at the same institute.
His areas of research include: Crisis Prevention as a Leitmotif for Development and
Foreign Policy; Global Governance and World Peace Order; Violent Conflict, Structural
Stability and Human Security in Sub-Saharan Africa; Post-Conflict State-Building.
E-Mail: tobias.debiel@inef.uni-duisburg.de
Monika Sticht, M.A., Monika Sticht, M.A., was Research Assistant at the Center
for Development Research (Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, ZEF), Department of
Political and Cultural Change, University of Bonn, from April 2003 to April 2005. Her
dissertation on the contribution of the Council of Europe to democratic transformation
in Middle and Eastern Europe since 1989 is due to be finished soon. Her areas of
research include: Promotion of Democracy; Rule of Law and Human Rights; the
Council of Europe.
E-Mail: M.Sticht@gmx.de
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht: Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian and Conflict
Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace,
University Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 79/2005).
IMPRINT
Editor:
Institute for Development and Peace, INEF
at the University of Duisburg-Essen
Logo design: Carola Vogel
Layout design: Sascha Werthes, Jeanette Schade
Cover photo: Jochen Hippler
© Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden
Geibelstraße 41 D - 47057 Duisburg
Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425
E-Mail: inef@uni-duisburg.de
Homepage: http://www.inef.de
ISSN 0941-4967
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht
Towards a New Profile?
Development, Humanitarian and
Conflict-Resolution NGOs
in the Age of Globalization
INEF Report 79/2005
Institute for Development and Peace University of Duisburg-Essen
Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF)  Universität Duisburg-Essen
Abstract
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht: Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian
and Conflict Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg: Institute for
Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 79/2005).
Both the significance and the profile of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
have undergone a fundamental transformation in the past twenty years. In de-
velopment cooperation new fields such as ecological sustainability and the
promotion of democracy have emerged besides ‘traditional’ issues like poverty
reduction. Furthermore, confronted with the realities of war and state decline,
developmental NGOs pay increasing attention to crisis prevention and the reso-
lution of conflicts; even a new type of nongovernmental organization has ap-
peared, conflict-resolution NGOs. The change has been particularly dramatic in
the area of humanitarian aid: even before the end of the Cold War some NGOs
– Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) at the head of all of them – freed themselves
from the “straitjacket” of only conducting humanitarian operations with the
permission of the (often illegitimate) local government; meanwhile the concept
of sovereignty has been substantially redefined. NGOs, however, also con-
formed to the imperatives of globalization and commercialization, and formed
oligopolies on the market for humanitarian aid. At the same time, they are also
confronted with their own “powerlessness” in conflict zones: actors of violence
and power-holders successfully attempt to instrumentalize humanitarian aid
for their own purposes, and western military forces threaten the independence
of humanitarian work by demanding subordination to political and strategic
goals.
Must we, at the beginning of the 21st century, bid farewell to the conventional
image of unselfish, flexible and diverse nongovernmental actors which blossom
freely like flowers? What criteria exist to assess the success of NGOs involved in
development policy, humanitarian aid and the resolution of conflict? This study
presents empirical data and illustrates it using concrete examples. It explains
above all which basic principles, codes of conduct and instruments of self-
assessment and self-control NGOs develop in order to safeguard and improve
the impartiality, credibility, transparency and effectiveness of their work.
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Introduction*
The age of globalization and the
end of the Cold War have dramati-
cally heightened and altered the
role played by private actors for the
fields of development policy, disas-
ter relief1, and conflict resolution.
Some  new  themes  –  including  the
issues of ecological sustainability,
promotion of democracy, or global
structural policy – have been placed
on the agenda. These have been
added to the project- and program-
based work engaged in by devel-
opment NGOs2, which has in the
main centered on the "classic" fields
of poverty reduction, healthcare
provision, promotion of the rural
population, or education (Eberlei
2002: 24; Hermle 2001: 16). But one
of the main reasons for the growing
influence of NGOs has been the
erosion of state authority in crisis
countries of the South. And not
least, NGOs are more and more
forced to work under the condi-
tions of "fragile peace", or indeed of
ongoing violent conflict.
* The  original  version  of  this  paper  (Ent-
wicklungspolitik, Katastrophenhilfe und
Konflikbearbeitung: NGOs zwischen neuen
Herausforderungen und schwieriger Profil-
suche) appeared in: Achim Brunnengrä-
ber/Ansgar  Klein/Heike  Walk  2005:  NGOs
im Prozess der Globalisierung. Mächtige
Zwerge – umstrittene Riesen. Bonn: Bundes-
zentrale für politische Bildung. We thank the
federal  Agency  for  Civic  Education  for  the
permission to publish an English version of
the article.
1  The terms “humanitarian relief,” “disas-
ter relief,” and “emergency aid” are used
synonymously in the present paper.
2  The English term NGO (nongovernmen-
tal organization) is used for the most part in
the German-language discourse; see Holtz
1997: 13; Altvater/Brunnengräber 2002: 8.
The growing importance and trans-
formation of development NGOs
cast a new light on some important
basic issues: How independent of
government funding and influence
are  these  NGOs in the actual  work
they do? How are NGOs respond-
ing to the commercialization pres-
sure  exerted  by  the  market  for  do-
nations and the need to build na-
tional and transnational networks?
How,  finally,  must  we  assess  the
effectiveness, legitimacy, and trans-
parency of development, humani-
tarian-aid, and peace NGOs? These
questions  play  a  key  role  for  hu-
manitarian work: in the first half of
the 1990s NGOs saw themselves
confronted in entirely new ways
with "complex emergencies". To
this extent disaster relief has be-
come a growing important field of
activity. Worldwide, NGOs like
CARE international Caritas interna-
tional, etc. provide a sizable contri-
bution in this field (Reinhardt
2000). At the same time, NGOs are
faced not only with substantial
coordination problems but with
moral dilemmas as well: Does
short-term emergency aid contrib-
ute  in  the  medium  to  long  term  to
sustaining  structures  of  force  and
violence? How are relations with
the military to be defined in the
framework of "humanitarian inter-
ventions"?
There is, in addition, another phe-
nomenon closely associated with
humanitarian disasters. The picture
of war has changed in the course of
the past 15 years: Political-ideo-
logical motives have been increas-
ingly supplanted by war-economy-
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related rationales. The conflict par-
ties  have  multiplied  and  moved
into shifting alliances. “Classic”
military conflicts have lost some of
their  significance,  and  events  are
now  dominated  by  guerilla  war
and massacres of civilians. In many
cases  the  conflict  parties  are  at  the
same  time  the  principle  war  profi-
teers; and this of course means that
they have very little incentive to
seek lasting peace. The stubborn
reality  of  the  "new  wars"  (Münkler
2002, Kaldor 2002) has also led to a
situation  in  which  NGOs  have,
since the mid-1990s, turned more
and more of their attention to pre-
vention of crises and violence (For-
berg/Terlinden 2002). This issue has
in  the  meantime  found  its  place  in
the "traditional" fields of develop-
ment cooperation and humanitar-
ian assistance. Is this more than
actionism, a merely fashionable
issue?  How  should  and  can  we
measure the success of conflict-
resolution NGOs? To what extent is
it possible to integrate crisis and
violence prevention into the every-
day  work  of  aid  organizations  ac-
tive in both development assistance
and humanitarian relief?
The present paper is an attempt to
come up with some answers  to  the
questions  raised  above.  The  paper
presents empirical data and illus-
trates them with concrete examples.
The aim pursued here to shed light,
from a critical distance, on some of
the challenges and problems facing
the  work  of  NGOs  in  developing
countries and – above all – coun-
tries in crisis.
We will start out by briefly defining
and systematizing NGOs; we will
then  go  on  to  present  some  of  the
important actors at the interna-
tional and national levels. Second,
we outline the ways in which the
functions  and  the  role  of  NGOs
have changed in a situation marked
by  eroding  statehood  in  the  age  of
globalization. Chapter 3 looks into
the independence and market
power, the networking efforts and
the legitimacy of development
NGOs. Fourth, we take an in-depth
look at the challenges and dilem-
mas faced by humanitarian relief.
We then, finally, discuss how crisis
prevention and conflict resolution
have become established as a new
field  of  activity  and  how  these
fields can be integrated into devel-
opment cooperation and humani-
tarian relief.
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1. Types, profiles, and players: the complex
reality of NGOs active in development
policy, humanitarian relief, and conflict
resolution
Following Gordenker/Weiss (1996),
we will define NGOs as private
nonprofit organizations with the
following features: they result from
a voluntary association of people,
are not subject to government di-
rectives, are designed to operate for
a certain period of time, and have a
formal character based on statutes.
International NGOs (INGOs) pur-
sue  transnational  goals  and  are
characterized by their transnational
operations and relations.
A brief look at the realities, though,
indicates  that  only  some  NGOs
meet  this  definition  in  its  "pure
form". Instead, many NGOs move
in a gray zone between political-
financial independence and more
or less strong ties to governmental
and multilateral donors. One phe-
nomenon typical of day-to-day
work in the fields of humanitarian
assistance and development and
peace policy is the great number of
different interlinkages found be-
tween NGOs, the state, and politics.
The  actors  in  the  NGO  sector  can-
not be classified and typologized in
terms of their distance or closeness
to the state or with a view to their
financial (in)dependence. Other
criteria include the resource base,
size, and membership of NGOs.
There  are,  for  instance,  a  good
number of small, highly flexible,
indeed  even  ad  hoc  NGOs  that
differ considerably in terms of their
competence and reliability. There
are also large, well-established
NGOs that are increasingly seeking
to build networks and associations
at the international level. This led to
a situation in which, in the first half
of the 1990s, nearly 50% of the US$
8-10 billion aid market was con-
trolled by oligopolistic players – i.e.
by  a  limited  number  of  NGOs
(Donini 1996). Some of the "global
players" active in this area have
included: CARE, World Vision
International, Oxfam Federation,
Doctors without Borders/ Ärzte
ohne Grenzen and Save the Chil-
dren. The transnational umbrella
organizations that represent the
interests of their member organiza-
tions and develop joint positions
would  include  the  Catholic  Co-
opération internationale pour le
développement et la solidarité
(CIDSE), the Association of World
Council of Churches related Devel-
opment Organisations in Europe
(APRODEV), and Eurostep.
In  Germany  too,  a  large  share  of
funding (including donations)
mainly benefit a small number of
large NGOs.3 A study published in
2000 by the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) indicates that in Ger-
many the 10 largest NGOs have
received some 70% of all donations
and other revenues provided for
North-South work (Woods 2000:
3 See also BMZ 2002: 254-258.
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62).4 As regards activity profiles, we
can distinguish between an opera-
tional profile and a public policy
profile. The former centers on con-
crete  operational  work  on  the
ground.  Policy-oriented  NGOs,  on
the other hand, seek to create pub-
licity and transparency as well as to
gain influence on the agendas, the
problem perceptions, and the deci-
sions of political and social deci-
sion-makers. This may include con-
crete lobbying in political decision-
making  processes  aimed  at  achiev-
ing certain self- or public-interest
goals (lobbying), monitoring of the
implementation of standards
agreed upon, "advocacy" or
"awareness-raising" on specific,
value-oriented issues in the public
and political sphere, or provision of
general information for a broader
public (public education).
Most non-state actors may be seen
as a mixture of these two profiles.
In addition to their core operational
business, some larger and estab-
lished  NGOs  like  e.g.  Oxfam  or
Doctors without Borders/ Ärzte
ohne Grenzen also have sizable
resources  for  their  activities  in  the
field of public policy. Only in this
way  are  they  able  to  credibly  con-
vince the public and political
spheres of the goals of and the need
for  their  work.  In  Germany,  the
church-based aid organizations
4 These 10 NGOs are the Catholic relief
organization Misereor, the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, the Hermann Gmeiner Fund,
Adveniat (founded by the German episcopal
conference), Brot für die Welt/ Bread for the
World, the (Protestant) Church Develop-
ment Service, Welthungerhilfe/ German
Agro  Action,  the  Deutsche  Komitee
UNICEF/ German Committee of UNICEF,
the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and the
Internationale Christoffel-Blindenmission/
Christian Blind Mission International (CBM
international).
(e.g.  Misereor  and  the  Katholische
Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe/
Catholic Central Agency for Devel-
opment Aid and the Evangelischer
Entwicklungsdienst/ Church De-
velopment Service and Brot für die
Welt/ Bread for the World), and
other organizations without either
church or party affiliations (e.g.
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe/ German
Agro Action, Kindernothilfe/ KNH,
Terre des Hommes, or medico in-
ternational) are to be mentioned in
particular.
A close linkage between opera-
tional and policy-oriented profiles
marks the German political founda-
tions, which play a pronounced
role in Germany's development
cooperation. At the same time,
there are also organizations that are
dedicated unequivocally to one
profile. Leading public policy
NGOs like Human Rights Watch or
the NGO think tank International
Crisis Group (ICG), for instance, do
not engage in any operational work
at all. In Germany a similar situa-
tion may be noted for organizations
like WEED (World Economy, Ecol-
ogy and Development), German-
watch or FIAN (FoodFirst Informa-
tion and Action Network).5
NGOs for the most part pursue
specific objectives bound up with
their origins and their ideologi-
cal/worldview backgrounds (Karp
1998: 296). For instance, the church-
based  aid  organizations  are  not
only  engaged  in  efforts  aimed  at
poverty reduction and improve-
ment  of  living  conditions,  they  are
also committed to building a just
social order. The political founda-
5  See <http://www.weed-online.org>, or
<http://www.germanwatch.org>, and <http:
//www.fian.org/> or  <http://www.fian.de>.
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tions in  turn,  in  keeping with their
affiliations to political parties, see
promotion of democracy as their
"core task" (Kesper 2002: 31; BMZ
2002: 256).
2. Privatization of public functions? Eroding
state authority and NGOs in the age of
globalization
The surge of globalization experi-
enced during the past two decades
has served to boost the significance
of internationally active NGOs.
Since the 1980s these NGOs have
gone through a period of exponen-
tial  growth,  a  fact  documented e.g.
by various issues of the "Yearbook
of International Associations". UN
organizations like e.g. UNESCO
(United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organization),
UNICEF (United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund), or WHO (World
Health Organization) have set up a
great number of different commu-
nication channels to facilitate direct
cooperation with NGOs. Further-
more, NGOs are increasingly taking
on  operational  tasks  in  UN-peace
missions and humanitarian assis-
tance  as  well  as  in  the  field  of  hu-
man rights and environmental pro-
tection.
We can observe a “privatization of
world politics” (Brühl et al. 2001)
that has permitted nonprofit or-
ganizations and private companies
to expand their radiuses of action in
both spatial and substantive terms.
This trend cannot be traced back to
any one single cause; nor did it take
place overnight. The background of
this development is, instead, a
more complex one (Debiel/Hummel
2001). To cite a number of factors
that should not be underestimated
in this context: first, the diffusion of
new information technologies and
mass media. This operates in favor
of the transnational networking of
non-state actors. Second, the end of
the  Cold  War  has  accelerated  ten-
dencies  toward  privatization.  The
big powers have largely ceased to
generously support their clients in
the  South,  leaving  the  task  of  pro-
viding for crisis regions more and
more up to NGOs. Third, the world
conferences of the 1990s, including
e.g. the UN World Conference on
Environment and Development
held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, con-
stituted a substantial incentive to
found new NGOs or  to  enlarge the
radius  of  action  of  existing  NGOs
(Messner/Nuscheler 1996; Fues/
Hamm 2001). The reform of the
guidelines for NGO accreditation
with the UN was also an influential
factor at work here.
Last  but  not  least,  a  central  role  is
played  here  by  the  triumph  of  the
“neoliberal project”, which experi-
enced a breakthrough in the 1980s.
It  is  in  the  dismantling  of  the  wel-
fare state, flexibilization of the
world of work, monetarist money
policy, major steps toward privati-
zation of state welfare and infra-
structure services, and worldwide
trade liberalization that the neolib-
eral  approach sees  the key to  over-
coming the slump that has beset the
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht
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dynamics of world economic
growth since the 1970s. Neoliberal
thinking is keyed to an attitude
highly skeptical of the state, one
that is reflected in the emphasis
given to the principle of subsidiar-
ity and the privatization of services
otherwise provided by the state. To
this extent neoliberalism has in
effect promoted the development of
civil society since the 1980s (Wahl
1996: 41).6 For  one  thing,  NGOs
have, in the sense of subsidiarity,
been assigned new service func-
tions, especially in the social and
health  sectors,  for  which  the  state
had until then been responsible.
The progressive critique of the
state, concerned about the emer-
gence of  a  growth-oriented,  expan-
sive, "authoritarian security state",
here ran up against a neoliberal,
conservative critique of the state
that had set itself the task of trans-
forming the "bureaucratic welfare
state". Civil-society organizations,
however, have also emerged as a
movement working counter to the
growing  –  and  not  least:  commer-
cial – tendency toward privatiza-
tion and calling for transparency
and democratic control (this goes in
particular for public-policy NGOs).
Since the end of the Cold War more
and  more  public  funds  have  been
channeled  via  NGOs  –  a  trend,
though, that now appears to be
abating.  To  cite  an  example:  the
average amount of funds channeled
by OECD countries via NGOs was
US$ 3.1 billion in 1985-1986 per
year, US$ 5.2 billion in 1990-1991
per year, US$ 6.7 billion in 1999,
and US$ 7.2 billion in 2001.7 NGOs
6 See Schrader 2000: 46-47; Roth 2001: 45;
Windfuhr 1999: 539.
7  The figures are based on: OECD/ Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC), The
have thus, since the early 1990s,
become an actor second in size only
to bilateral donors (Donini 1995:
426). The state's direct role in opera-
tional emergency and development
assistance is growing smaller and
smaller, with nonprofit organiza-
tions increasingly conducting pro-
jects and programs on behalf of
countries from the North. This new
role of NGOs is as noteworthy as it
is ambivalent (Sogge 1996). While
donor governments are increas-
ingly outsourcing the implementa-
tion  of  aid  programs,  this  by  no
means implies that they are leaving
the political decisions up to private
actors. Indeed, in many cases de-
velopment organizations are more
and more assuming the role of the
"private arm of donors" (Luder-
mann 2001).
In  view  of  the  declining  scope  of
state activities, development NGOs
increasingly see themselves faced
with the need to take on originally
government tasks in given devel-
opment countries – e.g. in health-
care or education. NGOs here
sometimes  even  undercut  the  au-
thority  of  public  agencies  and gov-
ernments. The International Mone-
tary Fund has often forced this
trend and the World Bank, whose
structural adjustment programs
have pushed for cuts in govern-
ment services. And yet, precisely in
crisis regions, the term "denation-
alization" does not adequately de-
scribe this process of privatization,
Total Net Flow of Long-Term Financial
Resources from DAC Countries to Devel-
opment Countries, available under:
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/dac-
stats.htm> (13 May 2003). The data are no
longer available online in this form. Up-to-
date DAC statistics on North-South financial
transfers can now be found under: <http://
www.oecd.org/dac/stats>.
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since  some  such  areas  lack  even  a
functioning state. Mark Duffield
(1993: 140-141) succinctly referred
to this development as the "interna-
tionalization of public welfare" (see
also Fowler 1992). Since the 1990s
the field of conflict management
has ceased to be the undisputed
domain of state and multilateral
actors – indeed, newly founded
non-state actors have become in-
volved  in  this  area  at  a  pace  that
can  only  be  termed  breathtaking.
They have in many cases done so
with state support (see Chapter 5).
3. Some reflections on the independence,
market power, networking, and legitimacy
of development NGOs
In science, politics, and the public
sphere NGOs are seen as having
some comparative advantages that,
initially, served to earn them a
"good reputation". The first point
here is their political independence
–  one  of  the  features  of  NGOs  that
has lent a high level of credibility to
the  arguments  and  activities  of
civil-society actors in the public
eye. NGOs are seen as particularly
flexible and effective: they are often
able – sometime at short notice – to
mobilize considerable resources,
e.g.  to  respond  rapidly  to  emer-
gency situations or to provide sup-
port  for  victims  of  human  rights
violations. NGOs are, however,
faced with organizational and fi-
nancial limitations. The more they
professionalize and gear their act-
ivities to efficiency criteria, and the
more they develop bureaucracies of
their own, the heavier may be the
toll in terms of voluntary commit-
ment  and  discourse  on  an  equal
footing, the sources of their
strength. On the other hand, NGOs
are unlikely to be able to achieve
the professionalism of state bu-
reaucracies or the efficiency of pri-
vate-sector companies as long as
they remain committed to their
original logic of action. Moreover,
bureaucratic apparatuses necessar-
ily  develop  an  existence  and  logic
of  their  own,  not  least  because  of
their constant need of funds (De-
biel/Hummel 2001).
The high level of respect originally
enjoyed by NGOs –  one of  the fac-
tors that accompanied their boom
in the first half of the 1990s – has by
now been impaired somewhat; and
there are more and more skeptical
voices to be heard. Four central
points of criticism are advanced
here:  NGOs,  it  is  aid,  are  not  as
independent  as  they  are  often
claimed  to  be;  their  profile  has
taken  a  problematic  turn  thanks  to
their orientation to the media and
markets for donations; their attract-
ive diversity is increasingly giving
way to hierarchically structured
and largely intransparent networks;
and finally, it is claimed, the devel-
opments referred to are increas-
ingly undermining their legitimacy
and transparency.
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht
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3.1 Independence at risk –
NGOs as vicarious agents
of the state?
As our discussion has indicated,
there are some good reasons to cast
doubt  on  the  independence  of
NGOs. In part, nongovernmental
organizations are consciously re-
cruited,  outsourced,  to  serve  as  an
extension of government policy.
Also, official and nongovernmental
development cooperation have be-
come closely intertwined owing to
financial transfers and numerous
processes of consultation as well as
to  the  inclusion  of  NGOs  in  gov-
ernment delegations and a great
variety  of  oversight  and  advisory
bodies. The German Federal Minis-
try  for  Economic  Cooperation  and
Development/ Bundesministerium
für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
und Entwicklung (BMZ) has, par-
ticularly over the past fifteen years,
increased  the  funds  it  provides  to
NGOs.8 Cooperation and consulta-
tion  are  part  and  parcel  of  day-to-
day operations, and have become
customary  practice  in  working  out
development-related country and
regional concepts.9 But  does  this
fact  imply  –  as  noted  by  Ansgar
Klein (2002: 3) – that nongovern-
mental  organizations  "are  often  no
more  than  the  vicarious  agents  of
state interests or a policy involving
privatization of development assis-
tance and humanitarian programs"?
In this case the consequence would
be  plain  to  see:  both  "states  and
private business interests are cash-
8  See BMZ 2002: 255, 375. For instance, in
2002  NGOs  were  given  a  total  of  EUR  459
million  for  their  work.  This  amounts  to
roughly 10% of the ministry's overall budget
expenditures.
9  See BMZ 2002: 253-255; Eberlei 2002: 25-
26.
ing in on the expert competence,
flexibility, effectiveness, and public
esteem of NGOs" (ibid.).
In  the  financing  of  German  NGOs
and political foundations, the pub-
lic-sector  share  is  substantial.  Not
many NGOs have a broad member-
ship  base  that  would  permit  them
to finance their work exclusively on
the basis of membership contribu-
tions and individual donations.
Many NGOs rely on outside financ-
ing by public authorities, private
foundations,  or  other  sources.  In
individual cases this can in effect
mean that NGOs assume the role of
implementing agencies of state
bureaucracies or mutate into com-
mercial service companies. This,
however, deprives them of their
main  advantage  and  the  base  on
which their public reputation rests,
namely their independence. In all,
though, the relationship between
state bureaucracies and NGOs has
tended  more  to  be  one  of  mutual
influence. In his thoroughgoing
analysis, Markus Karp (1998: 95-99)
emphasizes that the BMZ expects
NGOs to adapt their activities to
the broad lines of its development
policy. At the same time, he notes,
the  ministry  is  also  interested  in  a
semi-autonomous status for NGOs
– otherwise there would be little
reason to make use of them instead
of  the  ministry's  own  quasi-
independent implementing agen-
cies (GTZ, KfW)10 (Karp 1998: 97).
What  are  the  concrete  figures  in-
volved? It is difficult to determine
the  “public-sector  share”  of  NGOs
active in development policy and
10   GTZ  =  Deutsche  Gesellschaft  für  tech-
nische Zusammenarbeit/German Agency for
Technical Cooperation; KfW = Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau (German Financial Coop-
eration).
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cooperation, since this would re-
quire both a comparative tabulation
of the bi- and multilateral public
subsidies  they  receive  and  a  good
measure of transparency concern-
ing the internal resources and the
donations of all NGOs. Against this
background  we  can  do  no  more
than seek to compile some ap-
proximate  relative  figures  and  dis-
till trends from them. One indicator
in the German context is the public
bilateral subsidies (net disburse-
ments)  provided  to  NGOs  under
Section  23  of  the  BMZ’s  budget.
These figures can then be set in
relation  to  the  funds  that  NGOs
raise  from their  own resources  and
from donations.11 The percentage of
public subsidies based on these
criteria never exceeded 50% of their
overall revenues during the period
extending from 1974 to 1987. In this
period the figure ranged between
37.7% (1985) and 46.5% (1987). In
the  five  years  that  followed,  the
share  of  funds  provided  to  NGOs
by the BMZ exceeded their own
resources and donations, and con-
tinued  to  rise.  1992  was  the  high
point  for  the  share  of  public-sector
subsidies provided to NGOs as a
percentage of their total revenues;
the figure for this year was 64.7%.
In 1993 this public-sector share
declined to 56.9%, while the funds
raised by NGOs themselves were at
the same time on the increase. In
the years between 1994 and 1997
NGOs financed some 50% of their
activities on the basis of public sub-
sidies, and from 1998 to 2000 the
funds they received from section 23
11  The following data are based primarily
on the table “Bilateral public subsidies (net
disbursements to nongovernmental organi-
zations from Section 23 (BMZ)”, in: BMZ
2002: 375. These data cover the period from
1965-2000.
continued to  decline from 46.2% to
42.7% of their own revenues.
Between 1998 and 2000, as well as
in the period up to 1987, the NGOs
active in development policy and
development cooperation thus
funded their operations more from
own resources and donations than
from  government  subsidies.  Fur-
thermore, the donation revenues of
NGOs were not subject to any ex-
traordinary fluctuations in the
1990s. In other words, averaged
over  the  years,  the  figures  do  not
indicate  any  dominance  of  BMZ-
funding  in  the  revenues  of  NGOs.
In just about every year considered,
though, the figure has been over
40%, a clear indication that state
subsidies for NGOs have been and
are sizable and relevant. It is above
all the years 1990 and 1993 that
jump to the eye, with public subsi-
dies  accounting  for  some  60%  as
per section 23 of overall NGO reve-
nues. A percentage share of this
level  is  without  any  doubt  often
bound  up  with  state  influence  in
the  work  of  NGOs,  e.g.  as  regards
their orientation to the BMZ's pri-
orities and criteria.12 Still, these
figures should, in the end, not be
overestimated:  the  major  share  of
these public subsidies goes to the
German political foundations. In
the year 2000, for instance, the
German federal government pro-
vided these foundations with 37.9%
of the public-sector support funds
they received; the figure for church-
based organizations was 35.9%. All
of these groups are self-assured
actors  with  an  identity  and  history
12   For  comparison:  in  1993  in  the  OECD
framework the share of nonpublic subsidies
for  NGOs  averaged  58%,  while  in  the  same
year the public-sector share amounted to
42% (Woods 2000: 15-17).
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of  their  own,  and  none  of  them  is
particularly  likely  to  dance  to  the
tune of state financiers.
There is a broad spectrum of de-
pendence and independence re-
spectively  on  state  funds.  In  1997
several NGOs financed their activi-
ties wholly without public-sector
subsidies; they include e.g. Cap
Anamur and Ärzte ohne Grenzen/
Doctors without Borders. Others
relied on a funding mix. Medico
international, for instance, financed
its activities half from public-sector
subsidies and half from other
funds. An organization like HELP,
on the other hand, funded 92.5% of
its costs from public-sector funds
and was thus just about completely
dependent on public-sector subsi-
dies (Deutscher Bundestag: 110). At
the same time, dependence versus
independence is not something that
is indicated solely (and perhaps not
even primarily) by funding struc-
tures. Despite its noteworthy share
of state subsidies, medico interna-
tional,  for  instance,  enjoys  great
public respect for its statements and
campaigns, which may well deal
critically with government policy.
Dependence is thus also a matter of
an organization's credibility and –
hard-worked-for – standing in the
public eye, factors that can make an
organization less susceptible to
state leverage. In addition, devel-
opment ministries like the BMZ
may  be  forced  to  rely  on  NGOs  to
strengthen their own hand vis-à-vis
other ministries. NGOs that, in this
context, prove able to generate pub-
lic  support  are,  in  a  certain  sense,
natural allies that are difficult to
instrumentalize for other purposes.
Finally, it is essential to analyze
how the relationship between
NGOs and donors is anchored in
different political cultures. In Scan-
dinavia, for instance, NGOs are
more closely involved in the policy-
making  process  than  they  are  in
Germany.  Here  the  high  share  of
public  funds  is  not  so  much  a  sign
of  political  independence  as  it  is  a
reflection of a close mutual rela-
tionship.
3.2 Commercialized, media-
minded development
agencies?
The second point of criticism goes,
in a certain sense, in the opposite
direction: The more NGOs concen-
trate on acquiring donations and
new members, the more they are
forced  to  adapt  to  the  laws  of  the
market and the media world. This
entails a risk that such organiza-
tions may mutate more and more
into commercialized development
agencies, losing sight of their ori-
gins and instead narrowing their
focus down on the impacts of pub-
lic relations. To cite an example:
this charge of commercialization
was pointedly formulated by Sylvie
Brunel,  former  president  of  Action
Contre la Faim, as follows:
“I have the feeling that some NGOs
use  the  argument  of  suffering  to
justify  their  existence  and  increase
their  market  share.  To  keep  going
becomes their main reason for be-
ing and their real 'beneficiaries'
their nomenklatura. Many NGOs
are  only  associations  by  virtue  of
their fiscal statutes and the fact that
they  don't  give  out  dividends.  But
their marketing practices distance
them from their true objectives and
make them real businesses.”13
13  Interview with Sylvie Brunel, former
president of Action Contre la Faim, by Jean-
Dominique Merchet, in: Libération, March 7,
2002, ("Humanitarian Organizations Have
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In  fact,  NGOs  are  –  not  unlike  po-
litical parties – coming, in qualita-
tively new ways, to be reliant on
the  media,  not  only  as  a  means  of
getting their message to the public
but  just  as  much  with  an  eye  to
acquiring resources. This has impli-
cations  for  their  practical  work,  as
Thomas Gebauer (2001: 113) aptly
emphasizes: "The doubtful conse-
quences of the mass-media-
mindedness of NGOs and their
work  include  a  tendency  toward  a
reversal of the relationship between
ends and means and a restriction of
their activities to issues that can be
'sold' in and through the media."
Since NGOs are forced to rely on an
unbroken flow of donations to fund
their  project  and  program  work  as
well as to cover their own operating
costs,  they  have  no  choice  but  to
adapt to the functional mechanisms
of the media (Gebauer 2001: 113-
114; Roth 2001: 45-46). True, this is
a reciprocal relationship: the media
also  depend  on  NGOs  –  for  one
thing, because the latter know
something about launching issues
and giving them a slant congenial
to the media; for another because in
cases of humanitarian disaster
NGOs often have transportation
and infrastructure networks that
enable reporters to capture and
deliver "good image material".
This growing media-mindedness is
encouraging NGOs to shed their
original profile and instead to focus
on events with high public visibility
(e.g. the conflicts and wars in Soma-
lia,  Rwanda,  and Iraq).  Without  an
up-to-date media image NGOs
have trouble sustaining their in-
flows  of  public  and  private  funds.
Become Businesses"), via Internet: <http:
//www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/globdem/
credib/2002/0307bus.htm> (22 July 2005).
This trend takes on a problematic
hue when NGOs focus on generat-
ing make-believe world and cut
their grass-roots at the local level,
losing sight  of  both the interests  of
their social base and their contribu-
tions to "helping people to help
themselves" (Schrader 2000: 112).
3.3 Between self-
organization and
oligopolization: umbrella
organizations, networks,
and BINGOs
In the 1990s BINGOs (big NGOs)
like CARE, Caritas international, or
medico international came to play
an increasingly important role.
Furthermore, NGOs increasingly
organized in national and transna-
tional associations and networks.14
The year 1995, for instance, saw the
emergence in Germany of VENRO,
der Verband Entwicklungspolitik
deutscher Nichtregierungsorgani-
sationen e.V./"the Association of
German Development Non-govern-
mental Organisations", a federation
of  some  100  NGOs,  which  also  in-
clude some regional NGO networks
with local initiatives (VENRO 2003;
Eberlei 2002: 26-27; Reinhardt 2002:
382). At the European level, too,
there are networks that have their
eye  on  the  European  Union  as  a
contact partner. On January 30th,
2003, for instance, Europe was wit-
ness to the birth of a new associa-
14  Generally speaking, one distinguishing
feature of NGO associations versus net-
works  is  that  the  former  represent  their
member organizations, while networks tend
more to be loose associations that focus their
work e.g. on achieving progress on specific
individual issues.
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tion of European NGOs called
CONCORD.15
The goal  pursued in forming NGO
networks and associations is to give
more effective shape to lobbying
and  advocacy  activities  by  assum-
ing the function of mediators be-
tween different levels (local, na-
tional, international) and different
actors (states, international organi-
zations, other NGOs). Networks
can  in  this  way  contribute  to  im-
proving the internal coordination of
NGOs, enabling NGOs to appear
jointly before decision-makers and
international agencies, and facilitat-
ing the definition of joint codes of
conduct (Altvater/Brunnengräber
2002: 9).
However,  NGO  associations  are
also concerned with carving up and
controlling the donation market.
Finally, the later 1980s/early 1990s
saw  the  emergence  of  a  regular
market in which NGOs competed
for funds that were becoming in-
creasingly  scarce.  Apart  from  the
above-mentioned aims and possi-
bilities of NGO associations, the
latter also have advantages as far as
their presence in the media and
their media reach are concerned.
They furthermore facilitate out-
flows  of  government  funds  in  that
government authorities can now
15  See E+Z (Entwicklung + Zusammenar-
beit), (March 2003), vol. 3, p. 94; also: <http://
www.eu-platform.at>. CONCORD stands
for European NGO Confederation for Relief
and Development; it is the legal successor to
the Liaison Committees of Development
NGOs (CLONG). CONCORD represents
some 1.200 NGOs, some of them already
represented by a great variety of other Euro-
pean NGO associations like CIDSE or
APRODEV, while others, like terre des
hommes and Caritas Europa, are members
of  CONCORD.  See  also  <http://
www.concordeurope.org>.
fall  back  on  a  number  of  already
consolidated non-state contact part-
ners  with  whom  they  have  little
trouble reaching agreements on
uniform rules and procedures. This
has, especially in countries of the
South, led to a subcontracting cul-
ture in which NGO associations
channel  funds  to  intermediate  and
local NGOs (Wegner 1994: 341-342).
This gives rise, practically auto-
matically, to control problems. In
other  words,  there  is  a  real  danger
here that NGO associations may
take  on  hierarchical  structures  and
be controlled by a small number of
organizations or persons. This
would mean in effect that their
egalitarian structures would fall
victim to structures of dominance.
Moreover  –  and  in  analogy  to  the
state level – transparency presents
more of a problem, the more distant
organizations of a certain kind be-
come from their memberships and
a  critical  public.  This  is  at  times  a
particularly striking feature of
globally organized networks, which
are  as  a  rule  marked  by  an  overt
North-South differential as regards
influence, power, resources, staff,
and the power to define issues (Ge-
bauer 2001: 103-104; Roth 2001: 40-
41).
Apart from creating networks and
organizations designed for the me-
dium  to  long  term,  NGOs  have
also, with considerable success,
joined forces to launch campaigns
geared to  highly specific  goals  of  a
short- to medium-term nature. Such
campaigns link public relations,
education, mobilization, and lobby-
ing work, bringing together under
one  keynote  a  great  variety  of  ac-
tors  that,  faced  with  issues  of  a
different nature, would be unlikely
to reach consensus. At the same
time,  NGOs  are  increasingly  trans-
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nationally  organized.  They  are  in
this way responding to a need re-
sulting from globalization, namely
the need involved in efforts to gain
political influence and to go beyond
their own national government and
address  decision-makers  and  the
public in other countries.
3.4 Legitimacy, transparency,
and the key resource of
credibility
This brings us to the fourth point of
criticism: problematic legitimacy.
The more influential they become,
the greater the pressure faced by
NGOs  to  justify  their  actions;  the
reason for  this  is  of  course  that  the
existence and influence of  NGOs is
not legitimized by general elections
(Klein 2002: 4). The only means that
NGOs have to compensate, at least
in part, for this deficit is internal
democratic structures and strict
adherence  to  principles  like  ac-
countability, equality, and trans-
parency (Edwards et al. 1999).
These principles – precisely under
the conditions posed by transna-
tional  networking  –  are  increas-
ingly difficult to realize. In a grow-
ingly globalized world NGOs are
thus faced with problems similar to
those besetting supra- and interna-
tional organizations or transna-
tional corporations, which likewise
are marked by substantial deficits
in  legitimacy  (Klein  2002:  4;  Alt-
vater/Brunnengräber 2002: 12).
NGOs do have one advantage,
though: if they, in their role as sen-
sors  and  voices  of  society,  succeed
in monitoring state actors and le-
gitimized power-holders and/or
providing  them  with  guidance  in
coming  to  decisions  (Habermas
2001: 356-357), they win a "bonus"
in  the  eyes  of  the  public.  The  fact
that state and multilateral actors are
often not flexible enough to re-
spond adequately to new chal-
lenges  gives  rise  to  unoccupied
spaces in which privately organized
world politics may prove more
effective and issue-oriented than a
world politics based solely on the
classic model of the nation-state.
Private actors can, in other words –
despite weaknesses in their internal
makeup – gain profile and legiti-
macy by contributing, at the global
level, to the realization of basic
democratic norms and fair proce-
dures (input legitimacy) and effec-
tive and equitable provision of ser-
vices (output legitimacy) (Scharpf
1998).
They  must,  however,  ensure  that
their own weaknesses do not serve
to undercut their key resource of
"credibility". This credibility is not
to be had without a certain mini-
mum  level  of  transparency.  One
factor that is proving to be increas-
ingly problematic is that this trans-
parency cannot be seen as a general
trademark  of  the  work  of  NGOs.
Some interesting pointers are pro-
vided by a pilot study conducted
by "One World Trust (OWT)"
(2002/2003) which looked in to the
accountability of seven interna-
tional NGOs (Kovach et al. 2003):
amnesty international (ai), CARE
international, the International
Chamber of Commerce/ Interna-
tionale Handelskammer (ICC), the
International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), the Interna-
tional  Federation of  Red Cross  and
Red  Crescent  Societies  (IFRC),  Ox-
fam International, and the World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).
Only some of these organizations
are of interest in terms of the focus
of the present report; still, the ten-
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dencies revealed by the study are
quite instructive.
In  the  first  place,  OWT  sought  to
measure the extent to which mem-
bers  of  the  NGOs  under  study  are
able to control their internal admin-
istrative and power structures. Sec-
ond, the study looked into the issue
of access to information, restricting
its scope, though, to the online in-
formation services provided by
these  NGOs  –  a  factor  that,  while
certainly relevant, is limited in its
value as evidence (Kovach et al.
2003). What are the most important
results of the study? With the ex-
ception of amnesty international,
the NGOs under study made avail-
able only very limited amounts of
information on internal decision
processes.  As  far  as  control  of
membership is concerned, amnesty
international has the highest num-
ber  of  points  (100).  On  the  other
hand, among the NGOs analyzed,
CARE international has the lowest
ranking on “access to online infor-
mation”. For instance, hardly any
information on CARE interna-
tional’s programs can be found on
the Internet. Furthermore, these
organizations were restrictive in
making important information
available to the public – for instance
on the uses  to  which donations are
put  and  the  extent  to  which  goals
have been achieved. The picture
that emerges is somewhat differen-
tiated, though: while two organiza-
tions – namely Oxfam International
and  the  IFRC  –  have  provided,  in
their annual reports, detailed in-
formation on their finances, the
others have not. Hardly any of
them provide online information on
their evaluations of programs and
projects; a positive exception in this
regard is the IFRC.
Neither lack of any real control and
limited transparency as regards
finances and internal decision
structures nor the success nor lack
of success of an organization’s
work are features that are restricted
to the NGOs mentioned here. Eber-
lei (2002: 27) comes up with similar
results  for  German  NGOs,  at  least
as  far  as  their  work  abroad  is  con-
cerned: "While large-scale NGOs
have in the meantime developed
evaluation instruments, they do not
divulge their problems or engage in
a  broad,  transparent  discussion  of
the  chances  and  limits,  the  suc-
cesses and failures, of NGO work."
Despite all need for reform, how-
ever, one thing should not be ne-
glected. Unlike governments,
NGOs lack the power to  take deci-
sions binding on the public. Nor do
they – with some exceptions – have
the financial resources and the po-
litical clout and lobbying power
available to large corporations.
They  are,  instead,  voices  in  the
political  process.  And  they  there-
fore continue to need transparency
and legitimacy, even though the
standards used to gauge them can-
not  be  the  same  as  those  used  to
measure e.g. governments.
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4. NGOs and the growing number of
humanitarian disasters: challenges,
dilemmas, and attempts to come up
with solution
There are few reliable sources on
the number and in particular the
financial  status  of  the  NGOs  in-
volved in disaster relief (Reinhardt
2002: 378-379), although there are
figures  available  that  serve  to  cor-
roborate  evident  trends.  It  is,  for
instance,  safe  to  assume  that  the
number of humanitarian NGOs
active and their financial endow-
ments have grown dramatically.
While  in  the  1960s  the  UNHCR
(United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees) had only some
ten to twenty non-state partners for
its implementation work, the figure
had  grown  to  several  hundred  in
the 1990s. The European Commu-
nity Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
alone currently has framework
agreements with some 180 NGOs.
The amount of subsidies provided
by ECHO to European humanitar-
ian  relief  NGOs  is  impressive.  In
the mid-1990s their subsidy share
as  a  percentage  of  total  revenues
was 40%, in 2000 the figure had
increased to roughly 64% (Randal/
German  2002:  25;  Brasset/  Ti-
berghien 2002: 58).16 At the end of
the 1990s bilateral donors pro-
ceeded  on  the  assumption  that  at
least one quarter of their humani-
tarian funds were transacted via
16  For comparison: the share of other inter-
national NGOs in EU humanitarian aid
contracts was only 3.5% in 1999, the share of
local  NGOs  was  no  more  than  0.3%  (Brus-
set/Tiberghien 2002: 58).
NGOs;  and  the  figure  was  even
higher  in  some  countries,  e.g.  in
Denmark,  France,  the  US,  and  the
UK (Randel/German 2002: 24-25).
This rapid numerical growth
should, however, not be allowed to
obscure  the  fact  that  there  are  a
limited number of dominant NGOs.
UNHCR has noted in 1997, for in-
stance,  that  roughly  75%  of  the
public funds committed in emer-
gency situations go to some 20
European and North American
NGOs (Macrae 2002b: 15). The most
important players and networks
include Doctors without Bor-
ders/Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF), Médecins du Monde
(MDM),  Action  Contre  la  Faim
(ACF), and Oxfam. Another piece
of  evidence:  in  2000,  in  the US five
organizations accounted for 30% of
government expenditures in this
area;  these  were  CARE,  Catholic
Relief  Services  (CRS),  the  Interna-
tional Rescue Committee (IRC),
Save  the  Children,  and  World  Vi-
sion (Stoddard 2002: 48). With the
exception of World Vision and IRC,
these organizations are dependent
on government support for roughly
half  of  their  revenues  –  a  fact,
which may of course not be without
influence on their operational poli-
cies,  and  the  way  they  are  per-
ceived by the public (see Table 1).
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Table 1: US NGO funding sources (2000, US-$)
Total revenue/
support
US
government
support*
US gov't sup-
port as % of
total revenue
Other
governments
and IOs
Private
contributions,
revenue and
 in-kind
CARE 446.273.000 240.905.000 54% 121.486.000 83.499.000
CRS 382.865.000 237.227.000 62% 18.022.000 127.616.000
IRC 157.448.000 57.933.000 37% 61.727.000 37.788.000
SAVE 143.624.709 67.852.976 47% 8.673.635 67.098.098
WV 469.114.000 75.588.000 16% 11.330.000 382.196.000
Source:  Stoddard 2002: 48, Table 3, based on USAID 2001 (VolAg Report 2000)
Note: *  Includes food donations and freight costs in the framework of Public Law 480 (PL
480), which covers a “Food for Peace Non-Emergency Program”
The nominal expenditures of the
OECD countries for emergency
relief  increased  tenfold  from  the
early 1980s to the early 1990s. In the
1990s the amounts of humanitarian
aid provided roughly doubled. In
its January 2003 report "Uncertain
Power: the Changing Role of Do-
nors in Humanitarian Action," the
highly reputed Overseas Develop-
ment  Institute  (ODI)  assumed  that
expenditures in this area had in-
creased  from  US-$  2.1  billion,  to
US-$ 5.9 billion (in 1999 prices)
(Macrae 2002b: 11).17 The  share  of
humanitarian aid as a percentage of
ODA increased accordingly: "In
1989, relief aid accounted for less
than 5% of ODA. By 1999, this had
doubled,  to  10.1%  and  stood  at
10.5% in 2000" (Macrae 2002b: 11).
The growing importance of hu-
manitarian NGOs as well as of dis-
aster relief, initially gave rise to
coordination problems and raised
17  On the whole, be it said, official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) declined in the
1990s. Between 1974 and 1992 aid funding
grew constantly, finally reaching a level of
US-$ 62 billion. By 2000, though, it had again
declined by some 12% to US-$ 55 billion (see
Macrae 2002a: 11).
the question of codes of conduct. At
a more fundamental level, though,
the traditional self-perception of
humanitarian organizations has
been under discussion since the
1980s:  Is  it  still  possible,  under  the
conditions of persistent structures
marked by violence and military
intervention, to continue to adhere
to the model of impartial and neu-
tral aid?
4.1 Coordination and codes
of conduct
Coordination among aid organiza-
tions constitutes a structural prob-
lem.  This  goes  for  governmental,
multilateral, and nongovernmental
actors a well as the relations be-
tween them. As a rule, approaches
aimed at solving this problem focus
on the one hand on intensified ver-
tical coordination. This hierarchic
approach may boost efficiency in
the short term, but it entails a risk
of impairing the motivation, flexi-
bility,  and  independence  of  –  in
particular – small actors. Moreover,
there are approaches involving
horizontal coordination that tend to
be popular among NGOs, though
they may of course pose problems
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as far as reliability and practicabil-
ity are concerned. Improved coor-
dination is without doubt essential
to the coherence and efficiency of
humanitarian work, although it is
also  important  to  consider,  on  a
case-by-case basis, both what tasks
should be coordinated in view of
the competence problems and
transaction costs involved and at
what level it is most reasonable to
seek to improve coordination. A
recommendation which Margaret J.
Anstee  developed  for  Angola,  but
which is more general in character,
may serve as a pointer here: "Coor-
dination should be decentralised as
far as possible from headquarters to
field  and  thence,  if  feasible,  to  the
local level, with clear-cut defini-
tions of responsibilities and limita-
tions  of  authority  at  each  level."
(Anstee 1996: 175-176)
In  view  of  numerous  problems
encountered on the ground, hu-
manitarian NGOs launched a  great
number of initiatives aimed at de-
fining codes of conduct. Of particu-
lar  significance  in  this  context  is  a
Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief,
which was adopted in mid-1994 by
eight nongovernmental humanitar-
ian agencies (NGHAs), including
the International Committee of the
Red Cross/ Internationales Komitee
vom  Roten  Kreuz  (ICRC),  for  their
work in the field of disaster relief.18
The  "Code  of  Conduct  in  Disaster
Relief for the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement
and  NGOs"  defines  standards  of
conduct aimed at ensuring the in-
dependence and effectiveness of
18  ODI 1994; in July 2004 the Code of Con-
duct  was  signed  by  300  NGOs.  The  list  of
these NGOs can be found under: <http://
www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_disaters.pl?codecondu
ct_signatories.pdf> (19 July 2004).
relief operations. The document
contains ten codifications and three
annexes, which, however, are not
subject  to  any  verification  or  en-
forcement mechanisms (Bennett
1996: 138-139). Its most important
principles may be summed up, the
ICRC's words, as follows:
- the humanitarian imperative
comes first; aid is given regard-
less of the race, creed or nation-
ality of the recipients and with-
out adverse distinction of any
kind;
- aid priorities are evaluated on
the basis of need alone; aid will
not be used to further a particu-
lar political or religious stand-
point;
- NGOs shall endeavour not to
act  as  instrument  of  govern-
ment  foreign  policy;  NGOs
shall  respect  culture  and  cus-
tom;
- NGOs shall attempt to build
disaster response on local ca-
pacities;
-  ways shall  be  found to  involve
programme beneficiaries in the
management of relief aid;
- relief aid must strive to reduce
future vulnerabilities to disas-
ter  as  well  as  meeting  basic
needs;
-  NGOs  shall  be  accountable  to
both beneficiaries and donors.19
In Germany, furthermore, the For-
eign Office's "Humanitarian Aid
Coordinating Committee" has
agreed on a set of basic rules for
19   See  International  Federation  of  Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ed.), Code
of Conduct, available under: <http://
www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/> (19 July
2004).
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humanitarian aid.20 The Coordinat-
ing Committee – initially a discus-
sion group – was set up on April 9,
1992. Its realization that additional
coordination was called for stems
from  the  experiences  made  in  pro-
viding humanitarian aid to the
Kurds in the northern Iraq after the
Second Gulf War. The wave of refu-
gees  from  Rwanda  in  1994  then
made it clear that further coordina-
tion and a certain level of formal-
ization were called for; and this led,
on October 25, 1994, to the formal
establishment of the Humanitarian
Aid Coordinating Committee. The
Committee is not a central control
instrument  but  a  body  designed  to
serve the purpose of coordination.
Its members include 19 German
NGOs, VENRO, the Foreign Office,
and other relevant federal minis-
tries (including the Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment [BMZ], the Federal Minis-
try  of  the  Interior  [Bundesministe-
rium  des  Innern,  BMI],  and  the
Federal Ministry of Defense
[Bundesministerium der Verteidi-
gung, BMVG]).
4.2 Dilemmas and
politicization of
humanitarian aid
Humanitarian  disasters  are  not  a
specific feature of the era following
the end of the Cold War. However,
the situation has changed qualita-
tively, in particular in the past two
decades: people in emergency
situations have become more vul-
nerable. This is bound up in par-
20 See Auswärtiges Amt, Die Zwölf Grund-
regeln der Humanitären Hilfe, available
under: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/
www/de/aussenpolitik/humanitaere_hilfe/gr
undregeln_html> (22 July 2005).
ticular  with  the  fact  that  today  the
interplay between economic, eco-
logical, and political crisis factors,
the  combination  of  famine,  vio-
lence, and expulsion has made dis-
asters more complex and possible
reactions to them more difficult.
The  erosion  of  state  structures  in
numerous countries of the South
and the growing tendency of the
donor community to privatize relief
work has induced NGOs to take on
new tasks. Some NGOs, like CARE
international, Oxfam, or Caritas
international even have budgets
earmarked specifically for refugee
relief in war- and crisis-torn regions
which, in this particular area, are
larger than those of UN organiza-
tions (Reinhardt 2000: 784-785; Roth
2001: 45). Faced with this back-
ground, established NGOs have
been forced to rethink and adapt
their operational procedures. In-
deed, some new NGOs have even
been set up in response to these
specific challenges (Edwards et al.
1999).
Some of the advantages of NGOs in
disaster relief may be sought in the
fact  that  they  have  extensive  ex-
perience and expertise on the
ground.  Furthermore,  they are  as  a
rule more flexible than large inter-
national organizations like the
United Nations and able to inter-
vene in crisis areas without being
hobbled by time-consuming inter-
nal bureaucratic encumbrances
(Karp 1998: 101-102, 106). Like na-
tional and multilateral agencies,
however, NGOs are also faced with
substantial problems and dilem-
mas:  not  only  in  the  multi-  and
bilateral  sector  but  for  NGOs  as
well, it is seldom possible to coor-
dinate efforts with long-term de-
velopment  aims.  There  is  a  risk
here that disaster relief may in this
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way be reduced to the level of char-
ity for the losers of globalization,
who,  thanks  to  political  and  eco-
nomic development blockades, find
themselves on the margins of the
world system. In addition, relief
services tend to become an integral
component of civil-war economies.
They  contribute  to  bringing  about
substantial changes in economic
and currency relations, a situation
from which, in particular, politi-
cally and economically strong
groups of society tend to profit
(Duffield 1994: 59-63; de Waal/
Omaar 1996: 209-213). While mas-
sive inflows of food as well as large
grain purchases in neighboring
countries often alleviate the need of
people in threatened regions, these
practices likewise lead to marked
distortions of local power struc-
tures.  The  outcome  is  speculative
profits for dealers, commercial
farmers, and transportation com-
panies. Those in political power are
as  a  rule  good  at  profiting  from
outside support. One example is
“Operation Lifeline Sudan”, which
was organized under the auspices
of  UNICEF  and  the  World  Food
Programme/ Welternährungspro-
gramm (WFP) as a large-scale relief
action for people affected by war
and hunger. The warring parties
managed to instrumentalize part of
this  aid  for  their  own  purposes.  In
1989  the  Sudanese  government  is
even reported to have funded
roughly half of its military budget
from the operation. This was facili-
tated by an artificially undervalued
currency  that  made  it  possible  to
skim off substantial sums at an
exchange  rate  that  brought  losses
for  the  donors  and  gains  for  the
Sudanese government (Debiel
1996).
Finally, it is often claimed that hu-
manitarian aid organizations mis-
use  the  media  to  boost  their  dona-
tion revenues by generating a cer-
tain compassion effect. This close
link between fundraising and re-
porting in the media obviously has
the effect of favouring spectacular
or high profile projects. There is
also a risk here that the so-called
"CNN effect" will direct public at-
tention, in a more or less irrational
way, to certain regions, while
others are simply "forgotten".21 The
World Disaster Report (2003) re-
cently pointed to the ethical di-
lemmas involved here. In present-
ing  the  report,  Eva  von  Oelreich,
director of Disaster Preparedness
and Policy with the International
Federation  of  Red  Cross  and  Red
Crescent Societies, pointed out that
US-$ 1.7 billion was mobilized for
humanitarian relief measures with-
in  days  after  the  war  in  Iraq  came
to  an  end;  at  the  same  time,  how-
ever, the UN lacked US-$ 1 billion
which it needed, and which it had
called for in detailed appeals, to
alleviate the plight of 40 million
people in 22 African countries. Do-
nors and relief agencies are quite
evidently turning their attention to
disasters with a high political pro-
file; chronic emergencies are largely
ignored.22 One of the real dangers
of this short-term focus on "glaring
misery" is that it may lead the pub-
lic to ignore the deep-seated causes
of war and underdevelopment and,
in  the  end,  simply  to  acquiesce  in
21  See Roth 2001: 45-46; Gabbier 2001: 113-
114; Cater 2002.
22  Another important factor here is the
fight against transnational terrorism, which
is  increasingly  impacting  on  the  way  in
which  relief  funds  are  channeled.  See  IRIN,
18 July 2003 ("World Disaster Report high-
lights ethical dilemma").
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht
24
the collapse of many societies in the
impoverished South. And this, be it
said, stands in contradiction to an
important principle of the Code of
Conduct. According to it, disaster
victims must be acknowledged in
information, public relations, and
advertising measures as "dignified
human beings, not hopeless ob-
jects".
4.3 Humanitarian aid and the
military
Up to the 1980s the humanitarian
aid provided by NGOs played a
more  or  less  subordinate  role.  It
was often linked to programs con-
ducted by a host country with bi-
and multilateral support. Humani-
tarian NGOs seldom risked a con-
frontation with the government of a
host country. If they witnessed
human rights violations, this was as
a  rule  not  made  public.  Alex  de
Waal and Rakiya Omaar once re-
ferred to this as “humanitarianism
in a straightjacket” (deWaal/Omaar
1996: 205, 223). One important ex-
ception was Doctors Without Bor-
ders (MSF), a relief organization
founded in 1968 by Bernard
Kouchner.  In  view  of  the  war  in
Biafra (war of secession in Nigeria,
1967-70) MSF questioned the le-
gitimacy  and  effectiveness  of  two
basic principles that were and are
constitutive  for  the  world  of  the
International Committee of the Red
Cross  (ICRC)  and  at  that  time  de-
fined  the  work  of  just  about  all
NGOs: the practice of conditioning
the  supply  of  relief  services  on  the
consent  of  the  warring  parties  and
refraining from making any public
statements on circumstances on the
ground.  Some  two  years  later  the
debate was advanced another step
by  the  famines  that  took  place  in
Tigray in 1984/85 and in Eritrea in
1987/88, and in which the Ethiopian
government played a major role. In
1987 a group of prominent intellec-
tuals and humanitarian workers
around  Kouchner  formulated  a
widely noted “right to interven-
tion”  (droit d’ingérence) that was
conceived as a means of being able
to provide humanitarian aid even
against the will of the governments
concerned (Minear/Weiss 1995:  98).
The discussion over the ongoing
shift in state sovereignty intensified
in the first half of the 1990s. This
shift was influenced by an intensi-
fied “humanitarian intervention”
on  the  part  of  NGOs  and  a  drasti-
cally altered intervention practice
on the part of multilateral and state
actors. The United Nations experi-
enced a wave of new-type interven-
tionism that de facto placed a ques-
tion  mark  over  the  sovereignty  of
individual states, and whose frame
of reference came more and more to
be  violation  of  human  rights  and
minimum humanitarian standards
(Debiel/Nuscheler 1996).
We  can  look  at  it  from  whatever
angle we like: humanitarian aid has
become "politicized": to begin with,
humanitarian action has impacts on
power structures and violence-
based economies  in  crisis  regions –
a side effect that can be mitigated,
but not wholly prevented. Besides,
again and again NGOs themselves
have called, in the name of the
"humanitarian imperative", for
military intervention. This was the
case in the early 1990s in Somalia
and Rwanda no less  than it  was in
the late 1990s in the events leading
up to the war in Kosovo. The cases
of Somalia and Kosovo in particular
led to a rift right through the NGO
community, and sometimes even
straight through individual
organizations. The question at issue
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zations.  The  question  at  issue  was
and is the traditional self-
perception of humanitarian work.
The  war  in  Iraq  has  once  again  re-
kindled the debate over the dilem-
mas of humanitarian aid and the
relations between aid organizations
and the military. The first half of
the 1990s had already experienced
an intensive scholarly controversy
on this issue (Debiel/Nuscheler
1996); the discussion subsequently
subsided,  in  order  then,  after  the
1999 war in Kosovo, to flare up
again.  At  the  NGO  level  in  Ger-
many,  VENRO  has  since  then  ad-
dressed itself intensively to this
issue complex, pointing at many
meetings  as  well  as  in  numerous
publications and position papers to
the dangers that threaten the inde-
pendence of humanitarian aid
(VENRO 1999; 2000; 2003; Wenzel
1999).
On the occasion of the Kosovo war,
for instance, a VENRO discussion
paper entitled "Humanitarian aid
for reasons of state?" (1999: 2) noted
critically that the term "humanitar-
ian" was being co-opted for military
interventions, calling into question
the impartiality of humanitarian
aid (see also Eberwein et al. 1999).
Against this background VENRO
and  other  associations  of  NGOs
reacted critically to the Brahimi
Report (1999), which called for an
integration of humanitarian activi-
ties  with  UN  peace  operations  un-
der the leadership of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-
General. VENRO is also cautious in
its assessment of some new con-
cepts that were developed by
NATO  under  the  header  of  “Civil-
Military Cooperation” (CIMIC) and
have since been concretized and
further developed by the German
Bundeswehr (VENRO 2003: 8-9).
CIMIC expands the military’s spec-
trum of tasks into the civil and – in
particular – humanitarian sector
and also aims to tie non-state activi-
ties more closely to operational
military planning. One especially
problematic  aspect  of  this  is  that
humanitarian aid is losing the
autonomous  role  it  once  had  and
are gradually  becoming an integral
component of military operations –
not least as a means of boosting the
acceptance of the military among
the population on the ground.
Generally, NGO associations like
VENRO (but also many independ-
ent observers) take a skeptical view
of the sustainability of humanitar-
ian aid provided by military actors.
For VENRO, the Bundeswehr's
1993 Somalia mission "illustrates
that  a  medical  station  set  up  in  a
militarily efficient manner or a
technologically perfect well has a
chance of surviving only as long as
there are troops there on the
ground" (VENRO 1999: 4). Simi-
larly, the support provided by the
Bundeswehr in building refugee
camps  in  Macedonia  in  1999  is  ac-
knowledged but regarded as
suboptimal, since local organiza-
tions could have done the same
work  together  with  NGOs  and
refugees.
“As  far  as  has  been  regularly  re-
ported, NGOs use armed protection
on a regular basis in just four of the
approximately 55 conflict-affected
countries  in  which  they  are  work-
ing, namely northern Iraq, Somalia,
Russia (Ingushetia/Chechnya) and
northern Kenya. Armed forces may
also be used on a case-by-case ba-
sis, for example at border areas, for
instance in Rwanda. NGOs are not
drawing on protection from inter-
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national peacekeepers where there
are mandated UN operations, such
as in East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea or
Sierra  Leone.  Nor  are  they  using
protection from NATO-led forces in
the  Balkans.  In  some  cases,  NGOs
are using private security compa-
nies to provide protection. This has
been the case in Sierra Leone,
where the state sub-contracted se-
curity services to private compa-
nies.” (Macrae 2002b: 9)
The  US'  policy  in  the  war  in  Iraq
has further intensified the debate
on the militarization and instru-
mentalization of humanitarian aid.
The reason is that in connection
with "Operation Iraqi Freedom" the
US defense ministry has sought,
"both in the combat and the post-
combat phase, to 'embed' humani-
tarian aid in the US military strat-
egy" (VENRO 2003). And in March
of 2002 medico international held a
conference in Frankfurt/Main called
"Power  and  powerlessness  of  aid"
to discuss these issues. Cornelia
Füllkrug-Weitzel, director of the
Social  Service  Agency  of  the  EKD
(Evangelical Church in Germany),
speaking of the Code of Conduct
adopted in 1994, warned that hu-
manitarian aid was increasingly in
danger of becoming a hostage or a
plaything of politics. Since the Bal-
kan wars at the latest, she noted,
the humanitarian argument has
served as a justification for military
intervention, with humanitarian
organizations serving to heal the
wounds  of  war  and  indeed  some-
times even – as the US administra-
tion recently bluntly demanded
during the war in Iraq – as a vehicle
for winning the sympathies of the
population for intervening or occu-
pying  troops.  NGOs,  she  went  on,
may well  be  tempted in  such cases
to accede to such demands or blan-
dishments. On the one hand, she
noted, this could mean funds in
abundance from governments and
multilateral organizations; and on
the other hand there is hardly a
humanitarian organization active
today  that  can  "afford"  not  to  be
involved in a high-profile crisis
associated with military interven-
tion.  After  all,  the  aid  market  is  a
highly competitive one, and aid is
becoming an instrument of closely
interlinked business, media, and
political interests.
A study by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein
and  Peter  Runge  arrives  at  similar
results.  The  authors  note  that  the
independence of humanitarian aid
is increasingly faced with the threat
of being instrumentalized by the
state (Eberwein/Runge 2002). Af-
ghanistan is another recent exam-
ple. Here aid supplies dropped in
were not targeted in accordance
with the dictates of needs-oriented
efficiency; they served the purpose
of polishing the image of an anti-
terror  coalition  that  had  been  tar-
nished by massive bombing attacks
and of winning the sympathies of
the Afghan population by conduct-
ing  something  on  the  order  of  a
naïve “hearts-and-minds” opera-
tion (VENRO 2003: 13; Macrae
2002b: 8). Furthermore, Afghani-
stan  is  currently  being  used  as  a
testbed for experiments with a new
concept, which intertwines military
objectives with humanitarian con-
siderations. "Provincial reconstruc-
tions  teams"  (PRTs)  made  up  of
military and civilian personnel are
working there to rebuild infrastruc-
ture (e.g. schools, wells, health cen-
ters). The intention is to have these
PRTs  serve  as  points  of  reference
for NGOs and international
organizations (VENRO 2003: 13).
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Under such conditions NGOs are
likely  to  find  themselves  in  the
dilemma  of  either  having  to  coop-
erate in alleviating a crisis, even if
this means compromising their
own impartiality, or remaining on
the sidelines. In the US in particular
NGOs are faced with growing pres-
sure  to  act  in  the  capacity  of  in-
struments of the administration.
For  instance,  at  a  forum  convened
by InterAction – a network of relief
and development NGOs (including
CARE and Oxfam America – An-
drew  Natsios,  the  head  of  USAID
(US  Agency  for  International  De-
velopment), is reported to have
explicitly  referred  to  NGOs  and
private contractors receiving US
government funds as an extended
arm of the US administration
(Beattie 2003).
5. Crisis prevention and crisis resolution: new
challenges posed by war and state failure
In the past decade and a half NGOs
have  not  only  become  increasingly
involved in disaster relief; the
number of NGOs active in the field
of crisis prevention and crisis reso-
lution – so-called conflict-resolution
NGOs – has risen at the same time.
Both of  these  developments  can be
seen in one context: most observers
have come to the realization that
wars and violence threaten to de-
stroy  the  fruits  of  years  of  success-
ful development cooperation and
that preventive measures are there-
fore called for (Terlinden 2002: 57).
In view of the new world "disorder"
that  followed  the  end  of  the  Cold
War, NGOs find themselves in-
creasingly confronted with unpre-
dictable violent conflicts and are
thus more and more forced to  gear
their work to crisis prevention
(Edwards et al. 1999).
5.1 Conflict-resolution NGOs
– a new area of
responsibility in the
midst of a worldwide
boom
Beginning in the early 1990s, there
has been a massive expansion of
NGOs  active  in  the  field  of  con-
structive conflict management, and
many of them have developed
marked  profiles  of  their  own.  The
spectrum  of  their  work  extends
from training measures for social
multipliers, dialogue forums and
problem-solving workshops aimed
at middle-level social or leadership
circles to good services, nondirec-
tive facilitation activities, and direct
mediation at the political decision-
making level. This development
has various religious and secular
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roots.  The  Quakers,  for  instance,
who mediated in a great number of
conflicts  after  the  Second  World
War,  played a  pioneering role  here
(see Mawlawi 1993: 395). Their
work  was  highly  discreet,  and  it
was  perceived  only  by  a  small
group of experts. More influential
in  this  regard  was  an  upsurge  in
mediation activities in the US be-
ginning in the 1960s that started out
by addressing life world, commu-
nal, and interethnic conflicts. In
North America and Europe in par-
ticular, there are at present count-
less international organizations
active,  even  in  the  field  of  'high
politics'.
Founded in 1985 and based in Lon-
don, International Alert (IA) has
played a pioneering pilot role for
the rapid growth of conflict-
resolution NGOs. The organization
is active in many areas of the world
and  seeks,  in  its  own  words,  close
contact to regional and local part-
ners. The organization is involved
in developing training programs
aimed at developing conflict-
mediation capacities. Furthermore,
it is involved in issue-related fields
of action, including early warning
and preventive diplomacy, minor-
ity rights, network-building, and
grassroots  peace  work.  Finally,  IA
took on a direct role as a mediator.
But it was precisely this field of
activity that provoked criticism.
And  in  the  mid-1990s  the  Dutch
foreign ministry commissioned an
evaluation of International Alert’s
work that closely scrutinized IA’s
activities  in  Burundi,  Sierra  Leone,
and Sri Lanka. Aside from recogni-
tion for numerous successful pro-
grams, there were also marked
reservations. The tenor of the
evaluation  was  that  IA  lacked  a
clear and transparent strategy and
that the organization’s behavior
was  unpredictable.  It  was  recom-
mended that IA should concentrate
less on mediation and focus more
on strengthening local peace con-
stituencies  and  support  them  by
providing capacities, knowledge,
and resources for long-term con-
flict-resolution processes (Sørbø et
al. 1997).
One organization that has proven
particularly successful in conflict
mediation  is  the  Roman  lay  com-
munity Sant’Egidio, which is spe-
cialized in facilitation and contrib-
uted substantially to settling the
civil war in Mozambique. Begin-
ning in the mid-1970s, this ex-
tremely brutal conflict, accompa-
nied by famine and drought,
brought untold suffering over the
country’s population. In this situa-
tion  internal  social  forces  that,  in
the  1980s,  came  out  in  favor  of  a
political solution cleared the way
for negotiations. Sant’Egidio took
the initiative at the end of the 1980s.
The lay community had been en-
gaged  in  Mozambique  since  the
1970s and enjoyed the confidence of
both church and state authorities.
Its substantive competence and
credibility made Sant’Egidio a near-
ideal facilitator. The negotiations
between the parties involved in the
Mozambican civil war, which were
conducted  in  Rome  from  July  1990
to  October  1992,  led  to  acceptance
by all parties of the so-called Italian
formula – a new type of interplay
between NGOs, warring parties,
and international actors. The re-
gional actors Kenya and Zimbabwe
also contributed to the success of
these efforts.
The distribution of roles was un-
usual.  In  its  role  as  facilitator,  the
lay community Sant’Egidio shaped
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the course of negotiations; the su-
perpower USA focused on provid-
ing flanking advisory support,
though not without exerting pres-
sure where it was needed; Lonrho,
a transnational corporation, worked
for a regionalization of efforts to
find  a  solution  –  i.e.  one  that  in-
cluded the neighboring countries –
and  made  some  of  its  logistical
capacities available. Lonrho not
only contributed to initiating talks
and contacts with regional actors, it
also provided financial resources
and  transportation  services.  In  Oc-
tober 1992 this multitrack diplo-
macy succeeded in coming up with
an agreement. While the United
Nations were included in the proc-
ess only at a late stage, it neverthe-
less  managed  to  define  a  convinc-
ing  role  for  itself:  It  not  only  pro-
vided a framework and assumed
the role of a guarantor for the tran-
sitional phase extending from the
peace agreements to elections, it
also claimed for itself the leading
role in this follow-up process (De-
biel 2003: 107-129).
We  can  observe  that  as  their  pro-
files  grow  –  e.g.  thanks  to  the  in-
volvement of prominent personali-
ties – many of these conflict-
resolution NGOs tend to move
closer to the state sphere. One par-
ticularly  clear  example is  the Inter-
national Negotiation Network
(INN), which was founded by for-
mer US president Jimmy Carter and
is coordinated by the Carter Center
(Atlanta, Georgia). The Carter Cen-
ter  was  founded  in  1987;  its  objec-
tive is to provide, in the role of a
third party, background analyses,
consulting services, and public
relations work aimed at settling
conflicts by nonmilitary means. The
INN  operates  in  a  gray  zone  be-
tween the private and state sectors.
Accordingly,  the  INN  is  in  a  posi-
tion to provide 'eminent persons' as
mediators and contact persons.
Moreover,  it  has  direct  access  to
political decision-makers, and is
also in possession of sufficient re-
sources to develop the infrastruc-
ture  and  technical  support  needed
for negotiations.23 In  contrast  to
many other organizations, how-
ever, the Carter Center shuns secret
negotiations, always informing the
public when it acts (see Mawlawi
1993: 404). The INN has sought to
mediate in North Korea, the former
Yugoslavia, Haiti, Sudan, Burundi,
Rwanda,  and  Ethiopia.  Aside  from
conflict mediation, the INN is also
active in the key field of election
monitoring  –  these  two  areas  of
activity  are  also  linked,  e.g.  like  in
Liberia.
In Germany, an organization
known as the Plattform Zivile Kon-
fliktbearbeitung (Platform for Civil
Conflict Resolution), an association
of  German  NGOs,  was  founded  in
November of 1998 in Bad Honnef
(www.konfliktbearbeitung.net).24
The  Platform  is  a  joint  project  of
persons, organizations, and institu-
tions from peace work, human
rights work, humanitarian aid,
development cooperation, and of
scientists  active  in  these  fields.  The
Platform  is  an  open  network  that
23  See Mawlawi 1993: 404-405. There is also
an African organization, similar in makeup
to INN, called the African Leadership Fo-
rum; many regional mediators are recruited
from it (Amadou Toumani Touré, Olesegun
Obasanjo, the late Julius Nyerere, etc.).
24  The Platform sees its central activities in
efforts to improve the exchange of informa-
tion as well as in lobbying work. The Plat-
forms also serves as a clearinghouse for the
exchange of expertise. The organization’s
secretariat places requests for experts, or e.g.
search queries, into the network, clarifies the
requests and forwards them.
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includes more than 50 organiza-
tions and over 100 persons.
A new supporting organization
active in the field of conflict resolu-
tion is the Forum Ziviler Friedens-
dienst  (ZFD/Forum  for  Peace  Ser-
vice). Under the current Red-Green
German government the Forum has
achieved  its  goal  of  founding  "a
civil  peace  service  in  the  form  of  a
government-supported service pro-
vided by trained male and female
expert peace workers organized on
a pluralistic social basis" (www.
friedenbrauchtfachleute.de). It has
over 120 individual members and
40 member organizations. Thus far
it has provided professional train-
ing for over 120 expert peace work-
ers. Its zfd500 campaign aims, by
2006, to train at least 500 additional
men and women and to appoint
them as peace workers25 (Luder-
mann 2003).
A  guide  to  "Konfliktbearbeitung  in
Deutschland" (Conflict Resolution
in Germany) (Fiebich 2001) demon-
strates how diverse the spectrum of
relevant organizations has now
become. In Germany the Berghof
Forschungszentrum für konstruk-
tive Konfliktbearbeitung/ Berghof
Research Center for Constructive
Conflict  Management  has  broken
new ground in providing training,
dialogue workshops, and capacity-
building, e.g. in Sri Lanka and in
the Georgia-Abchasia conflict.
25 Peace experts are active in crisis regions
throughout the world for peace and devel-
opment services or international organiza-
tions  like  the  OSCE.  Prior  to  their  missions
they are given several months of training. In
their mission areas they support local initia-
tives  such  as  women’s  or  human  rights
groups, mediate between conflict parties,
provide for venues, and organize coopera-
tion efforts.
New EU-wide structures have also
been created that have encouraged
close cooperation and exchange of
expertise  in  the  form  of  a  "policy
network". One clear example is the
European Platform for Conflict
Prevention and Transformation
founded  in  February  1997  in  Am-
sterdam. Early in 1997 a number of
different international organiza-
tions, research institutions, and
NGOs  joined  forces  to  found  the
Forum for Early Warning and Early
Response (FEWER).26 In  the  au-
tumn  of  2002  roughly  a  dozen  or-
ganizations active in the field of
conflict resolution set up a Euro-
pean Peacebuilding Liaison Office
(EPLO), a independent subgroup of
the European Platform. Its aim is to
ensure  improved  access  for  NGOs
to the EU's activities in this issue
area,  to  fortify  transparency and to
facilitate the information flows for
NGOs. This cooperation with non-
state  actors,  many  of  them  in  pos-
session  of  vast  knowledge  and  di-
rect contacts with the grassroots in
crisis regions, has been a contribut-
ing  factor  in  inducing  the  EU  to
accord more attention to the social
and political causes of conflicts in
its conception of development pol-
icy (Debiel/Fischer 2000).
26  They include the European institutions
International  Alert  (UK),  the  PIOOM  Foun-
dation (NL), the Russian Academy of Sci-
ences/Institute of Ethnology (Russia), but
also e.g. the Council on Foreign Relations
(US), York University (Canada), and some
UN agencies. Another organization closely
associated with FEWER is e.g. the Schweize-
rische Friedensstiftung/Swiss Peace Founda-
tion) (SFS) in Bern which has developed an
information system for early analysis of
tensions and fact-finding (Früh-Analyse von
Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung,
FAST).
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Regions  of  the  South  have  also  ex-
perienced an NGO boom.27 In  Af-
rica, for instance, conflict-resolution
NGOs are now quite widespread.
In its publication "Searching for
Peace in Africa" the European Plat-
form  for  Conflict  Prevention  and
Transformation presents profiles of
some 100 Africa-based conflict-
resolution NGOs; in addition, it
contains presentations of 23 inter-
national NGOs active in this area.28
5.2 Instruments used to
anchor crisis prevention
in development
cooperation and
humanitarian aid
It  has  been  noted  repeatedly  since
the end of the 1980s that external
support in crisis and conflict situa-
tions can entail extreme alterations
to the political and economic situa-
tion  on  the  ground  and  unsettle
local  markets.  Indeed,  aid funds or
goods  are  sometimes  diverted  into
given  areas  to  supply  troops  and
purchase arms or to secure political
support. Moreover, implicit mes-
sages sent by external actors may
also have subtle but far-reaching
effects: For instance, establishing
contacts with warlords – something
that relief organizations are often
unable  to  avoid  –  may  serve
unintentionally to boost the
27  For an overview of all world regions, see
<http://www.euconflict.org/>. The header
"Conflict Prevention/Organisation" includes
overviews on conflict-resolution NGOs
throughout the world (listed by region,
alphabetically, etc.).
28  See Monique Mekenkamp et al. 1999.
With  its  regional  focus,  the  overview  ex-
pands on the brief descriptions published a
year before by the European Platform (1998)
in "Prevention and Management of Violent
Conflicts: An International Directory".
tentionally  to  boost  the  formers’
legitimacy.
This debate concerning the ambiva-
lence of humanitarian aid gave rise
to the “Do No Harm”29 principle
(Anderson 1999). What this impera-
tive  implies  is  that  those  active  in
the  field  should  subject  their  work
to critical self-reflection, and it at
the same time serves to sensitize
them to the impacts that their own
actions may have on conflict con-
stellations. Collaborative for Devel-
opment Action, Inc. (CDA)30 has
advanced the approach and is con-
cerned with seeing it implemented
both  in  humanitarian  aid  and  in
development cooperation. The “Lo-
cal  Capacities  for  Peace  Project
(LCPP)” and the “Reflecting on
Peace Project (RPP)”31 have ana-
lyzed numerous case examples
with a view to identifying negative
impacts on conflicts and deriving
from positive experiences scopes
for constructive action. The cases
stem  from  nearly  all  regions  of  the
world,  e.g.  from  the  South  Pacific
(Fiji), Asia (Sri Lanka, Philippines,
Afghanistan), Africa (South Africa,
Kenya,  Uganda,  Burundi,  South
29  The “Do No Harm” Principle is derived
from  the  Hippocratic  Oath,  according  to
which medical treatment must not harm the
patient.
30  The activities of CDA, which was
founded  in  1985,  are  generally  focused  on
economic and social development in Asia,
Africa, Latin America, and central and east-
ern Europe. As far as its measures and ac-
tivities in the field of conflict prevention and
resolution  are  concerned,  CDA  works  to
promote the role played by third parties in
conflicts and post-conflict situations. See
<http://www.cdainc.com/index.php>.
31  Since 1994 the LCPP has been carried
out jointly by numerous operational NGOs
active  in  crisis  regions.  The  RPP  is  also  a
joint initiative of more than 50 NGOs whose
work often brings them face to face with
violent conflict.
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Sudan), the Middle East (Palestine
and Israel, Cyprus), Europe (the
Basque country, Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, the Crimea, Croatia, Georgia,
and South Ossetia), and Latin
America (Columbia, Guatemala,
Chiapas in Mexico).
Parallel to the “Do No Harm” ap-
proach, various donor countries (in
particular Sweden, Canada, Nor-
way,  and  the  UK)  and  NGOs  like
CARE,  Oxfam,  and  Save  the  Chil-
dren are working for a comprehen-
sive integration of this problem
complex  into  their  efforts:  “These
efforts are geared more towards
mainstream peacebuilding within
the more traditional mandates of
humanitarian assistance, poverty
alleviation and sustainable devel-
opment. Increasingly, concepts,
ideas and practices are migrating
across the once clear demarcations
between the traditional fields of
development, humanitarian assis-
tance, conflict resolution and
peacebuilding.” (Hoffman 2001: 1)
One approach, which includes
various strategies, mechanisms,
and methods of conflict resolution,
is "peace and conflict impact as-
sessment" (PCIA) (see Austin et al.
2003). Following Ken Bush, PCIA
can be defined as a “means of
evaluating (ex post facto) and an-
ticipating  (ex  ante,  as  far  as  possi-
ble)  the  impacts  of  proposed  and
completed development projects
on: 1) those structures and proc-
esses which strengthen the pros-
pects for peaceful coexistence and
decrease  the  likelihood  of  the  out-
break, reoccurrence, or continua-
tion of violent conflict, and; 2) those
structures and processes that in-
crease the likelihood that conflict
will be dealt with through violent
means.” (Bush 1998: 7)
The call for peace and conflict as-
sessment was and is closely bound
up with the fact that cooperation
and humanitarian aid must be seen
as problematic or indeed as having
failed in numerous crisis countries
in  the  South:  “In  Somalia,  interna-
tional aid organizations were inad-
vertently drawn into rivalries be-
tween clans. In order to gain access
to  needy  segments  of  the  popula-
tion, they paid protection money
and tolerated hefty 'taxation' of
relief supplies by the militias. As a
result, in the final analysis they
were effectively contributing to  the
financing and prolongation of the
conflict. Similar patterns were also
observed in Ethiopia and southern
Sudan.  In  contrast,  the  genocide  in
Rwanda, which until that time had
been considered a model country as
far as development cooperation
was concerned, raised the question
as to whether a mistaken develop-
ment model had been promoted for
many years – one which perpetu-
ated  the  structures  of  social  exclu-
sion and discrimination (Uvin
1998).” (Leonhardt 2001: 11)
.
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Table 2: NGO strategies and impacts
Direct intervention Capacity-building Advocacy
Fuelling
conflict
Aid used to purchase
arms
Providing support to
political front organiza-
tions
Advocacy  which  sup-
ports one of the warring
parties to the conflict
Holding
operation
"Smart" distribution of
relief so that it does not
increase underlying
tensions
Support for local organi-
zations such as irrigation
councils, church-based
groups etc.
Protection of civilians
against human rights
abuses
Peacebuilding
Projects which bring
different ethnic groups
under the same pro-
grammatic umbrella
Support for civic peace
groups
Advocacy for peace,
justice, and reconciliation
Source: Goodhand/Hulme 1997: 24, Table 3
NGOs active in crisis situations (see
Table 2) may aggravate a conflict,
alleviate the suffering caused by
crisis situations (holding opera-
tion), or – in the most favorable
case  –  provide  a  contribution  to
peacebuilding.
The situation is at present marked
by  a  heightened  sensitivity  as  re-
gards the potential chances and
risks of development cooperation in
crisis situations (see Table 3).
Against this background, numerous
theorists and practitioners of devel-
opment cooperation have taken a
close  look  at  PCIA  and  developed
some approaches and methods of
their own. In some countries, e.g. in
Kenya and Guatemala32, various
PCIA approaches have been and
continue to be used and tried out in
practice (Leonhardt et al. 2002).
32 The aim of the PCIA project in Kenya
and  Guatemala  (which  has  already  been
concluded) was to develop practical tech-
niques  and  instruments  for  the  planning,
monitoring, and evaluation of development
projects and to strengthen conflict sensitiza-
tion. These practical experiences have led,
among other things, to the conclusion that a
country-specific PCIA approach is preferable
to a universal PCIA methodology. A further
conclusion is that conflict analysis should be
tied  more  closely  into  project  planning  and
integrated within a project cycle with an
ongoing monitoring process. See Leonhardt
et al. 2002: 3 et seq., 30-33.
Tobias Debiel/Monika Sticht
34
Table 3:  Opportunities and Risks of Development Cooperation in Conflict
Situations
Conflict factor Risks Opportunities
Politics
Development cooperation (civil conflict
management is inadequately harmo-
nized with diplomatic and military
initiatives and consequently has a
counter-productive effect
Development cooperation indirectly
strengthens illegitimate and authoritar-
ian political structures
Development cooperation weakens local
forms of government by setting up
unsustainable parallel structures
Various instruments of conflict man-
agement are used in a coordinated
and sensitive manner
Development cooperation strengthens
legitimate formal and informal politi-
cal structures
Development cooperation promotes
participation and respects local owner
Development cooperation adopts a
committed but neutral attitude to the
conflict
Economics
Development cooperation distorts local
economic processes and strengthens war
economies
Development cooperation amplifies
existing regional or socio-economic
inequalities and discrimination
Development cooperation promotes the
unsustainable use of natural resources
Development cooperation consolidates
disputed claims to natural resources
Development cooperation trains indi-
viduals who later join armed groups
Development cooperation identifies
and strengthens legitimate local eco-
nomic processes
Development cooperation promotes
equality of opportunity, particularly
for disadvantaged groups
Development cooperation promotes
collaboration and cohesion through
joint activities
Development cooperation promotes
sustainable and just systems of re-
source utilization
Development cooperation supports
economic alternatives to the use of
force
Socio-cultural
factors
Development cooperation neglects local
social capital and institutional capacities,
creates dependency
Development cooperation takes over and
reinforces patterns of perception which
encourage conflict (e.g. ethnicity)
Development cooperation add fuel to
existing lines of conflict through well-
meaning but poorly implemented peace
initiatives
Development cooperation promotes
committed individuals ('human capi-
tal')  and  peace  initiatives  at  the  local
level
Development cooperation strengthens
local coping strategies and thus re-
duces vulnerability to the conflict
Development cooperation supports
confidence-building and reconciliation
Security
Development cooperation ignores the
human-rights and security situation in
the country
Development subsidizes warring groups
by accepting theft and 'taxation' of relief
supplies
Development cooperation employs
uncontrolled private security services,
thus exacerbating miniaturization…
Development cooperation reports on
infringements  of  human  rights,  and
because of the international presence
enhances the security of the popula-
tion
Development cooperation avoids
becoming  instrumentalized  by  war-
ring groups by following clear princi-
ples
Development cooperation creates
security structures in close collabora-
tion with partners and target groups
Source:  Leonhardt 2001: 17-18; based on: Anderson 2000; Hulme/Goodhand 2000; Klinge-
biel 1999; Leonhardt 2000; Uvin 1998.
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It is still too early to judge the qual-
ity  and  effects  of  PCIA,  since  the
tool is still in the development
phase and has  been in  use in  prac-
tice  only  for  a  limited  number  of
years.  But  it  can  be  said  that  the
approaches that point ahead are
mainly  those  that  are  organized  in
cooperation between North and
South  NGOs  and  seek  to  ensure
that structures of dominance are
not replicated at the evaluation
level.
5.3 Assessment of the
conflict work of NGOs
The crisis prevention and conflict-
resolution work of NGOs focuses
on different levels. The spectrum
extends  from  diplomacy  at  the  po-
litical decision-making level to ef-
forts  at  the  local  level.  In  the  plan-
ning and implementation of pro-
jects the possibility is given to
minimize the potential for an esca-
lation of violence, for instance by
constructively and cooperatively
involving persons at risk in project
work (Terlinden 2002: 1-2, 4). One
successful example of crisis preven-
tion  can  be  named  in  the  field  of
water management in the northeast
of Kenya. Here CARE international
UK worked to strengthen the tech-
nical and administrative capacities
of water users associations (WUAs)
as well as to support municipalities
in developing expertise and meth-
ods needed to constructively re-
solve resource conflicts.
The – wholly welcome – growingly
important role played by conflict-
resolution NGOs and the integra-
tion of conflict resolution within
development cooperation and hu-
manitarian project work should,
however, not be permitted to ob-
scure  the  fact  that  NGOs  –  much
like governmental and multilateral
actors  –  do  not  always  have  a  pri-
mary  and  undivided  interest  in
constructive intervention. The work
of NGOs is all too often influenced
by  masked  interests,  intrinsic  or-
ganizational factors, or the pressure
exerted by the media and the pub-
lic, as was observed e.g. in the wake
of  the  genocide  in  Rwanda.  More-
over, approaches like PCIA are
easily misinterpreted as a socio-
technological endeavor. Such ap-
proaches may tend to underesti-
mate the possible destructive im-
pacts of external actors, while over-
estimating the possibilities that
conflict resolution has to bring
about changes in persistent struc-
tures of violence.
What is called for precisely in pro-
longed and persistent conflicts is
modesty  –  i.e.  the  precept  “Be
Modest” – an imperative of reason
and realistic self-appraisal. Here
both conflict parties and external
actors  usually  find  themselves  in  a
conflict-prone environment that
may well also be unstable and even
harbor marked self-destructive
tendencies. Apart from state failure
and the existence of economies of
violence, another important factor
in such situations that is especially
detrimental  to  finding a  solution is
that the conflict parties are often
fragmented: In such cases the
chances open to constructive influ-
ence are limited.
In such constellations the manifold
engagement of external actors may
serve  more  to  create  confusion  by
defining new lines of conflict, per-
mitting conflict parties to instru-
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mentalize external forums, and
blurring the lines of responsibility
for agreements on settling conflicts.
The  Burundi  conflict  is  a  case  in
point here: In the course of the
1990s multilateral, governmental,
and nongovernmental actors
launched a good number of – some-
times competing – mediation initia-
tives. While these initiatives led to
constantly reshuffled rounds of
negotiations, they failed to end the
conflict (to say nothing of coming
up with a sound political arrange-
ment). The imperative of modesty
therefore, also implies that external
actors should reflect critically on
their contributions and seek to in-
tegrate them, in the sense of a divi-
sion of labor, into a course of con-
certed action.
Another model may be seen in the
“Do  No  Harm”  principle  men-
tioned  above.  But  at  present  the
challenge  is  to  continue  to  factor
critical self-reflection not only into
operational  action  at  the  project
level but also, and comprehen-
sively, into the overall complex of
trade, development, and security
policy.  The  field  that  has  made
most  progress  here  thus  far  –  at
least at the conceptual level – is
development policy. To cite an
example, at the end of the 1990s the
Western industrialized countries
commissioned, in the OECD
framework,  a  landmark  study,
much  along  the  lines  of  PCIA,  on
“The Influence of Aid in Situations
of Violent Conflict” (Uvin 1999).
Some  important  insights  were  also
provided by a series of relevant
comparative studies commissioned
by the BMZ; the studies looked into
the impacts of development coop-
eration for the cases of northern
Mali, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Ethio-
pia, Kenya, and Rwanda.33
One central challenge facing civil
society forces is to critically accom-
pany  these  evaluations,  and  to  call
for transparency and public scru-
tiny. Also, the “Do No Harm” prin-
ciple can be developed politically
into a new imperative: “Don’t Fuel
Violence”,  i.e.  do anything to  exac-
erbate an ongoing conflict. The
NGOs assembled under  the roof  of
the network Eurostep, for instance,
are  working toward this  end when
they call on the EU and its member
states  to  pay  more  heed  in  their
crisis-prevention strategies to the
role played by arms exports and the
trade in tropical timber, diamonds,
or oil, a factor of key importance for
war economies. One further de-
mand  must  be  to  restrict  the  vio-
lence-promoting role that may
sometimes be played by diaspora
communities.
NGO conflict-resolution work
should – this is the essential point –
be neither all too harmony-minded
nor blind the aspect of power. This
goes  for  their  relationship  to  their
own  government  as  well  as  to  au-
thorities abroad and international
organizations. In many cases state
actors  may  tend  to  aggravate  a
conflict or devote too little effort to
overcoming conflict factors, be-
cause they, in cases of doubt, are
apt  to  give  priority  to  power-  and
alliance-related considerations and
economic interests over serious
efforts devoted to conflict preven-
tion. But multilateral organizations
in many cases pursue approaches
33  The cross-sectional report was prepared
by  the  Deutsche  Institut  für  Entwicklungs-
politik/German Development Institute (DIE)
in Bonn; see Klingebiel 1999.
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dictated by bureaucratic logics,
particularist interests, or the block-
ade policies of powerful member
states.  NGOs  active  in  the  field  of
conflict resolution would therefore
be well advised not only to view
themselves as moderators, commu-
nication facilitators, trainers, or
capacity builders. In many cases
NGOs can achieve more by acting
in  the  capacity  of  watchdogs  and
doing  their  best  to  gain  a  good
grasp  of  complex  situations  and  to
create critical counterpublics. If
they are serious about their work as
lobbyists and advocates of peaceful
conflict resolution, NGOs active
here will be without the convenient
option of acquiescing in their role
of mere implementing or project
organizations (in receipt of large
state subsidies). Only by assuming
a  critical  stance  toward  the  state
will  they  be  able  to  do  justice  to
their original peace-oriented claim
to be a vibrant element of civil soci-
ety.
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